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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES" 
As noted in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512 
(1989), it is the province of the Appellant to frame the issues on appeal, for "the party who 
brings a suit [or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . . " Appellant's 
"Statement of Issues" bears little resemblance to the issues raised by Appellant and appears 
to be an attempt at cross-appeal. The statement should be ignored. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS" 
Appellee is correct at Br. 1 in stating that this is an appeal from the denial of a 
motion by Appellant seeking to set a custody decree aside. However, the remainder is little 
more than argument, based upon misstatements of fact and fabrication, and should be 
disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee raises 25 points of argument in his response brief, many of them redundant. 
Points 2., 3., 4., 10., 20., and 21. all involve Appellee's claim that this appeal was not 
timely filed. These are the same issues that were raised and briefed in Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction and require no further reply except to point out that 
Appellee continues to make arguments in his brief that were not warranted by law and were 
frivolous when made in his motion to dismiss. However, he now has the benefit of 
Appellant's reply to his motion, and if he didn't know the law then, he sure did when he 
prepared his response brief. 
1 
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Point 9. also appears to be an attack on the timeliness of appeal not raised in 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. Appellee seems to be arguing that Mr. Kimball's affidavit 
and testimony is not newly discovered evidence and therefore the Rule 59 Motion to Alter or 
Amend was not effective in tolling the time for appeal. 
He cites no law for this proposition and totally ignores the case law readily available 
in the annotations to this rule. All hold that a timely motion under Rule 59 U.R.C.P. 
terminates the running of the time for appeal, and time does not begin to run again until the 
order granting or denying such order is entered, (e.g. Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 
309 [Utah 1979]; Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990]) 
Not a single Utah case holds that the time for appeal is tolled only if the trial court 
finds that the Rule 59 motion is well taken, as Appellee suggests (Appellee Br. pp. 26, 27). 
Such an interpretation would place counsel at risk of malpractice every time a Rule 59 
motion was filed unless notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the original judgment 
regardless of the outcome of the motion. This argument is frivolous. 
At Point 6. (Appellee Br. p. 22), Appellee argues that Appellant is barred by the "law 
of the case" from the relief sought herein. No cases are cited or evidence marshalled as to 
how the law of the case applies. Instead, Appellee cites cases holding that a party must 
show a "substantial change of material circumstances" before a decree can be modified. 
Appellee ignores the fact that this is not an attempt to modify the decree and the cases cited 
by Appellee are totally irrelevant. 
Appellee argues at Point 7. (Appellee Br. p. 22) that Appellant had a chance to 
/ 
protect herself (presumably from Mr. Kimball's conduct) during the trial of this case and that 
/ 
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she failed to do so by failing to call Mr. Kimball as a witness. Further, he argues at Point 
23 (Appellee Br. 43) that deference should be accorded the trial judge on this issue (of 
awarding custody). 
Ignored is the fact that the "trial" was actually an evidentiary hearing solely on the 
issue of modifying visitation from supervised to unsupervised. Other issues were not before 
the trial court and not relevant. Further, as pointed out below, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are so insufficient that one is unable to determine why the trial court 
awarded custody to Appellee. So how can this unknown determination be given deference? 
This argument is without merit. 
At Paragraph 8. (Appellee Br. p.25) the laches argument is made. Appellee argues 
that Appellant's "delay" in pursuing an order setting the decree aside was unreasonable. 
However, the record shows no delay. For upon retaining new counsel on May 4, 1992, 
(Attachment A of Appellant's Brief), a motion to set the decree aside was prepared and filed 
on May 26, 1992.(Rec. 658-704, 707-708) Further, as set out below, she did not learn that 
a default decree had been entered until the end of January, 1992, at which time she was 
again relying upon Mr. Kimball. 
Appellee's claim that the delay between filing the motion to set aside and the courts 
eventual ruling should be attributed to Appellant, is like the pot calling the kettle black.. 
(Appellee Br. p. 26) Appellant has no control over the trial court's schedule. She filed a 
timely notice to submit her motion for decision on June 16, 1992 (Rec. 745) And on June 
17, 1992, Appellee filed an objection to the notice to submit, arguing that the court had 
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previously determined that Appellant's motion to modify the visitation provisions should be 
resolved before the court acted upon the motion to set it aside. (Rec. 747-748) 
And, several days later, Appellee got around to filing a response to the motion to set 
aside (Rec. 749-759); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the objection and responsive 
brief (Rec. 761-768); followed by Appellee's Amended Response to Motion to Set Aside 
(Rec.814-824); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the amended response. (Rec. 825-
826) (The memo in support of this motion does not appear in the record for some reason and 
is attached hereto as Attachment A) 
A cursory examination of the above documents will reveal that it was Appellee who 
was trying to delay the trial court's ruling on the motion to set aside, not Appellant. Further, 
this examination will reveal a pattern followed by Appellee throughout this entire litigation of 
ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and twisting facts to meet his purposes. (Not to 
mention the impropriety of Attachment C of Appellee's Brief) And, Appellee is clearly 
trying to mislead this court as well. 
Points 1., 5., 15., 16., and 17. of Appellee's brief are all based upon a claim that 
Appellant's answer was withdrawn and the default decree entered against her as a result of 
her stipulation that it be done. Appellee's proof of a stipulation consists of Appellant's 
infamous letter of November 4, 1991 (Rec. 410-413; Appendix A of Appellee's Brief) and 
Mr. Kimball's signature approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree. 
However, a review of the November 4th letter indicates absolutely no basis for the 
misdeeds perpetrated upon Appellant on November 12th and 13th of 1991. And when 
reviewed together with the affidavit of Mr. Kimball (Rec. 1380-1383) as well as the 
/ 
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testimony of the parties set out below, it is clear that there was no meeting of the minds, no 
knowing waiver of rights, and no authority for Mr. Kimball to do what he did. Finally, the 
trial court's minute entry of November 12, 1991 (Rec. 414) indicates on its face that the 
custody arrangement discussed in the telephonic scheduling conference was a temporary 
arrangement indicating that it was "until such time the Defendant has resolved her problem." 
(Rec. 414) 
Attempts by Appellee, and the trial court, to justify what occurred the following day 
on the basis of the November 4th letter is horribly misplaced. For this letter was intended as 
a personal communication to Appellee, the father of Appellant's only child, not for the 
benefit of the attorney's or the court! (Rec. 2175) Appellant's expressions of frustration and 
resignation made in a personal letter to Appellee hardly rise to the level of a stipulation or a 
settlement agreement. Instead, this letter reflects Appellant's repeated refusal to sign off on 
Appellee's settlement demands and states "I am not giving up and neither is my family." 
(Rec. 411) Yet, seven days later, Appellee managed to twist this personal letter into a 
stipulation for withdrawing Appellant's answer and counterclaim, and entering a default 
decree against her while Mr. Kimball stood lamely by. (Appellee Br. p.35: "This letter 
constitutes a default") This is hardly justice. 
Appellee argues at Points 11. and 12. that the Findings supporting the award of 
custody were adequate because (1) custody was not at issue (Appellee Br. p. 28, 29) and, (2) 
adequate findings were incorporated by reference in the form of the so-called custody j 
evaluation of Patricia Smith, Phd. (Appellee Br. p. 29-34) However, regardless of the 
number of facts Appellee incorporated into the findings and conclusions by reference, they 
( 
\ 
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have a fatal flaw in that they never explain why the trial court felt one parent better than the 
other. They simply fail to articulate a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by 
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests of the child. Sanderson v. 
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) 
Appellee cites the case of Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) 
[Specific findings are not required where custody is not an issue.] in support of his 
contention that the findings were adequate in the instant case. He argues that custody was 
not an issue in the instant case because it had been resolved by the supposed "stipulation" 
(the November 4th letter and Mr. Kimball's agreement to the findings)k 
However, the Ebbert case is not applicable because custody was, and is, the only 
issue, and hotly contested in the instant case. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim 
seeking custody (Rec. 299-302) And just prior to the entry of the default decree, she was 
resisting attempts by Appellee and Mr. Kimball to get her to sign stipulations giving 
Appellee custody. (Rec. 2169) As Appellee's attorney, Mr. Barker stated: 
...it's been broached the fact that there's been several attempts at stipulation, and 
none of them included supervised visitation. Lest the court be misled into thinking 
it's (supervised visitation) some kind of a punishment later, we need to establish 
through these documents that she refused to even sign the very most basic two 
paragraph stipulation. She wouldn't put her signature on anything. (Rec. 2066-2068) 
And Appellee testified: 
[Exhibit] thirteen is the settlement stipulation, a final settlement stipulation with my 
signature on it, dated the 5th day of November, 1991, (8 days before the default 
decree was entered) which was the product of five successive weeks of weekly 
meetings between myself, yourself, Chase Kimball, attorney for Karen Thompson, 
( Karen Thompson, and Deborah's guardian ad litem, Arnold Gardner; and also 
/ countersigned by the custody evaluator, Patricia Smith. (Emphasis added) 
/ 
/ Q. And the shorter one, the second one, which would be thirteen, I guess? 
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A. Yes. It's a two paragraph stipulation, merely saying that John Putvin shall 
receive sole permanent custody; Karen shall receive minimum standard visitation. 
(Rec. 2067-2068) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Barker) Mr. Putvin, those stipulations and the unwillingness to 
sign them on Karen's part, why does that have anything to do with your concern that 
there's a flight risk, and there should be supervised visitation? 
A. Well, first, in her deposition as has been entered in this record, she refused to 
hypothetically agree to some stipulation that if one party moved, the other would get 
custody. There was a great deal of ovation on that. Secondly, in this document it 
stipulates that either party, a physical move by either party would be considered a 
material change of circumstance, which would warrant a review of the custody 
arrangement. And she refused to sign that.[No kidding!] (Emphasis and editorial 
added) 
* * * 
Q. With regard to those stipulations, what should make Judge Hanson believe if 
anything that that concern is still real, there's still a concern that her refusal to sign 
those stipulations, or other activities in relation to the court indicate there's still a 
risk? 
A. She sent me, personally addressed to me, her November 4th letter, and in that 
she says I'm not giving up the fight, but I'm not going to fight the devil, ie, you. 
(Rec. 2069-2070) (Emphasis added) 
Appellee has also testified as to the vehemence with which Appellant contested 
custody, stating "...she's contested my name on the birth certificate, and Deborah's middle 
name, and has opposed vehemently any effort on my part to have that corrected." (Rec. 
2064) 
Appellant's uncontroverted testimony is: "Because Chase [Kimball] was insisting that 
I sign those other documents. As a matter of fact, he threatened me over the phone. And I 
could not accept the way he was going on it." (Rec. 2175) ' 
( 
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In response to Mr. Barker's question: 
Now you have made some pretty serious accusations against Chase Kimball. Can you 
tell us what threat he made to you to get you to sign? He threatened you to try to get 
you to sign a stipulation, is that what you said? 
she testified: 
He was yelling at me in a very loud, and screaming voice over the phone, and he 
says, you had better sign that. He says you better call me back within five minutes 
with the answer to sign this, or you will loose your daughter, and you will be very, 
very, very sorry. And he kept saying that over and over, and was very, very 
threatening in his demeanor. (Rec. 2179) 
Approximately one week later, Mr. Kimball made good his threat. 
Thus, it is obvious that immediately prior to the supposed settlement which Appellee 
claims made custody a non-issue, Appellant was adamantly refusing to settle or stipulate 
away her claim to custody in spite of the threats of her own attorney! Thereafter, Appellee 
used the November 4th letter and the complicity of Appellant's counsel to not only obtain 
permanent custody, but an onerous visitation arrangement which effectively cut Appellant off 
from any meaningful relationship with her daughter. (The quote of Judge Hanson at 
Appellee Brf. p.23 is enlightening on how this was accomplished.) And, shortly thereafter, 
Appellee and the child moved to New Zealand. 
The above testimony is also enlightening as to the argument made by Appellee at 
Point 18. and 24. For, as Appellee admits at Brief 40-41, in January, 1992, when Mr. 
Kimball attempted to act on Appellant's behalf in this action, Appellee filed a Motion to 
Require Proof of Authority (Rec. 506-507) The obvious inference is that Appellee had 
reason to believe Mr. Kimball had been discharged from the case. 
/ 
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Mr. Kimball's affidavit in response to this motion (Rec. 499-500) does imply that his 
representation of Appellant had been continuous and unbroken up to that date and to this 
extent, is inconsistent with his later affidavit in support of the motion to amend. (Rec. 1380-
1383) However, this later affidavit is clearly against Mr. Kimball's interest in that it exposes 
him to civil suit for malpractice as well as professional disciplinary action. 
More importantly it corroborates the inference that Appellee knew of his lack of 
authority and provides a timeframe wherein Appellee obtained this knowledge (Before 
Kimball approved the findings and decree). He had absolutely nothing to gain and 
everything to lose in giving this affidavit and its credibility should be given great weight. 
Appellee's argument, that Mr. Kimball did represent Appellant at the time the decree 
was entered, misses the point. Whether he did or didn't, it is uncontroverted that he was not 
authorized by his client to withdraw her answer and counterclaim, enter into a stipulation on 
her behalf, approve findings of fact, conclusions of law or the entry of a default decree. In 
fact, he was specifically directed otherwise by his client. 
The uncontroverted testimony of Appellant is as follows: 
Q. When was the first time you saw that custody decree? 
A. If I've seen it, I think I have, if I've seen it, it was I went with you to the 
courthouse. 
Q. When was the first time you ever became aware of the custody decree? 
A. I believe it was toward the end of January, and I don't even remember how I 
found out, but I was very upset, and I called Chase, and raked him over the coals for 
it. 
Q. Did you ever authorize Mr. Kimball to withdraw your answer? r 
A. Did I ever authorize? 
9 
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Q. To withdraw your answer to this lawsuit, and let it go by default? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever authorize him to approve, or sign the Findings of Fact or that 
default decree? 
A. Absolutely not. In the first place, I didn't know there was a default decree 
going on. In the second place, he wanted me to sign one of these other things, and 
when I refused, he said, well then let me sign it. I said, absolutely not. If anybody 
signs it, it will be me, and you're not. (Rec.2170-2171) 
In any event, it is manifestly unjust to sanction Appellant for Mr. Kimball's duplicity 
and abandonment, or for bringing it to the trial court's attention. 
CONCLUSION 
It is obvious from the record that Appellant was unjustly denied a fair hearing on her 
claim to custody of her child. Instead, the misdeeds of Appellee and Appellant's attorney, 
Mr. Kimball, resulted in a default decree of custody which allowed Appellee and his other 
wife, to whisk the child away to New Zealand. Since that time, Appellant has had to swim 
up the stream of Appellee's numerous and meritless, motions, petitions, personal injury 
actions and all else that a bottomless pocket and a willing attorney can devise to vex her. 
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and 
remand this matter for a hearing on the issue of custody. Further, Appellant should be 
awarded attorney's fees for proceedings in the trial court and on appeal, pursuant to Rule 33, 
/ / / 
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U.R.A.P. and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. for the numerous frivolous pleadings filed by Appellant 
since May, 1992. 
DATED this 2£& day of 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant has been hand delivered to Mitchell R. Barker, 349 South 200 East, Suite 170, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this 3 D day of . \pM^M. - , 1994. 
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Daniel Darger (0815) 
Attorney at Law 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN : 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, : OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
vs. 
CivifNo: 910903188 CS 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL : 
Defendant : Judge: Hanson 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff by and through her attorney Daniel Darger, Esq., and hereby 
submits the above-entitled Memorandum. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On May 26, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel a motion and 
memorandum to set aside the default custody decree entered in this matter. (Exhibit A) 
2. On June 2, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel an addendum to 
Defendant's memorandum in support of said motion. (Exhibit B) 
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3. On June 16, Plaintiff had failed to file a responsive memorandum and on said 
date, Plaintiff filed a notice to submit. (Exhibit C) 
4. On June 17, 1992, Plaintiff filed an objection to the notice to submit. (Exhibit 
D) 
5. On June 18, 1992, Plaintiff mailed to Defendant a response memorandum to 
Plaintiffs motion to set aside. (Exhibit E) 
6. This Court has entered no order extending Plaintiffs time to respond nor has it 
entered an order staying the determination of Defendant's motion or otherwise delaying the 
decision on Plaintiffs motion. 
7. On June 26, Defendant received Plaintiffs Amended Response (Exhibit F) 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IS UNTIMELY 
AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
Rule 4-501 is clear in its requirement that a responsive pleading shall be filed and 
served within ten days after service. The use of the mandatory word "shall" indicates that 
strict compliance is required. Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2nd 204 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Mandatory requirements must be complied with precisely) 
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that the procedural time 
requirements must be strictly complied with, unless a motion to extend the time is timely 
made, or upon motion and a showing of excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P. 
The cites to these decisions are too numerous to include herewith considering the number of 
2 
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different rules to which they relate; e.g. Rule 12 (answer), rule 52 and 59 (motion for new 
trial), appellate Rule 4, etc. 
While the appellate courts in Utah have yet to rule on directly on this issue, the Court 
of Appeals has indicated in dicta that a responsive memorandum must be timely for it to be 
considered in ruling on a motion. In the case of Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2nd 1205 
(Utah App 1991), the court reversed an order of summary judgment because it was entered 
prior to the expiration of the ten day period for filing a responsive memorandum. The court 
stated: "...the trial court should have considered such a response, if timely received, before 
ruling on the motion to strike and the summary judgment motion." (emphasis added, at page 
1208) 
Plaintiff was served with Defendant's motion on May 26, 1992 and the response 
would have been due on June 8th, with the three day mailing period included. Defendant 
served her addendum on Plaintiff on June 2, 1992 and Plaintiff waited an additional thirteen 
days after this date to file the notice to submit. Thus, Plaintiff had at least twenty one days 
in which to prepare a response, which he failed to do. Thus, the filing of an amended 
responsive memorandum thereafter, is untimely and this court should strike this pleading as 
not complying with Rule 4-501. 
The alleged basis for Plaintiffs objection and the late filing of his memorandum and 
amendment should be of substantial concern to this court. As the Court will recall, it noted 
Defendant's motion to set aside while in chambers prior to the beginning of the evidentiary 
hearing on Defendant's motion to modify visitation, he Court commented that a decision of 
the motion to set aside may make the evidentiary hearing moot. However, Plaintiff states in 
J 
i 
\ 3 
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his objection that this Court "stated that Defendant's earlier motion, to modify the visitation 
provisions of the decree, should be determined before the instant motion is considered." 
(Exhibit D) And in his memorandum, Plaintiff argues that his responsive memorandum is not 
yet due because the courts comment referred to above somehow had the effect of staying 
Defendant's motion to set aside, or tolling or extending the time within which Plaintiff is 
required to answer. As this court is aware, Plaintiffs position has absolutely no basis in fact 
or law. 
To begin with, it defies logic and reason as to why this court would stay the decision 
on a motion that may make a prior motion moot until the prior motion can be decided. If 
anything, reason would dictate that it be the other way around. More importantly, this Court 
entered no such order and no motion for such an order has been filed. Assuming the fact that 
Plaintiffs counsel is a licensed member of the Bar, he is presumed to know that the alteration 
•4 
of time requirements set by procedural rules can only be done upon stipulation or motion 
properly brought before the court, and not by the courts spontaneous comment in chambers. 
If he is not so aware, Rule 11 would require that he make inquiry. Instead of filing a Rule 
6(b) motion, and providing a showing of excusable neglect, Plaintiff simply ignores the law 
and files his memorandum. 
Of equal concern is Plaintiffs outright misrepresentation of the facts. The comment 
in chambers as recalled by this counsel was not as Plaintiff represents. However, Defendant 
will leave it to the court to construe its own comments. Suffice it to say that this does not 
amount to excusable neglect where, subsequent to the comment in chambers, Plaintiff was 
served with V 
4 
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Defendant's addendum to the memorandum, clearly indicating that Defendant had no illusions 
that her motion to set aside was not proceeding forward. 
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court disregard 
Plaintiffs amended memorandum in ruling upon Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default 
decree. Further, this court should strike said pleadings from the record as untimely. 
Dated th feP^ day of /fl/14 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of "(he foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692. this~2.U dav of^Ofr-*— , 
1992. 
• ^ ^ s A l ^f> v vjrAvwt 
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Daniel Darger (0815) 
Attorney at Law 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SET ASID: 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
>f-f* 
Civil No: 910903188 CS 
JuGsc: Hanson 
Motion is hereby made for an order setting aside the default custody decree entered in 
the above matter by this Court on November 13, 1991. Tnis motion is made pursuant to Rule 
60 (b) (5) in that said judgment is void to the extent that it provides relief different in kind 
from or exceeding that specifically prayed for in plaintiffs complaint or to the extent that 
said decree goes beyond the actual decision of this Court. 
/ 
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Furthcr, this motion is made pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7) in that said decree is 
"improper, or illegal, and voidable." ( P & B Land. Inc. v. Klungervik. 751 P.2nd 274 [UL CL 
App. 1988] at page 277) 
Basis for this motion is more particularly set out in defendant's memorandum in 
support hereof, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
Dated thiSeCZfe? day of f v , 1992. 
/ V h^S, €ci> C\-jr^ 
Daniel Darker 
Attorney ai Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE* 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 2 true and correct copy of the foregoing Morion has been 
mailed, post2ne prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2S70 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 
84115-3692, th i sTU day of TVSH U 1992. 
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For the reasons above stated, defendant respectfully 
the Findings of Fact, Concl 
requests that this Court set aside 
usions of Law and Custody Decree previously entered. 
1A Duted this J2J^'
 m day of "]{/[f,^ 
., 1992 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barkcr.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84115-3692, this Oi l* day of t W ) ! A . 1992. 
G10mot.pri 
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Daniel Darper (0815) •*'•'"'* 
Attorney at Law 
](K) Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL 
Defendant 
ADDENDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil Net 9.10903188 CS 
Judce: Hanson 
COMES NOW, Defendant by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and 
hereby submits the above-entitled Memorandum. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the facts set forth in her 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on file herein. 
1 
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A mere finding that the panics air or arc not "fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the care, custody and control" of the child cannot pass muster when the 
custody award is challenged and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urged on 
appeal. (Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2nd 994 [Utah 1986] at page 994.) 
This exactly the instant case. The findings merely recite that Plaintiff is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded custody. There is no finding as to what would be in the best 
interest of Deborah. And, in facL this coun could not make the required findings based upon 
the evidentiary record as it is. Tnere has been no evidentiary hearing to allow the coun to 
hear and weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, nor is there a stipulation signed 
by the parties as to what those facts are. Since the custody issue was not tried upon the facts, 
there is simply no evidence for the court to sift in determining the best interests of Deborah 
and, thus, the findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
For the additional reasons above stated. Defendant respectfully request that this Court 
set aside the findings of faci conclusions of law and custody decree heretofore entered. 
Dated this 
C ^ 
' C2V 01 / I,, iu.v~ 
/ 
19992. 
CPrc^ 
DANIEL DARGER 
Auomtv for Plaintiff T 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
has been mailed. postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South Stats Street. Salt Lake 
City. UT 84115-3692. this ' £ • day of - Z T w » ^ . 1992. 
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Daniel Dargcr (0815) 
Attorney for Defendant 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVLN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON 
Defendant 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Civil No: 910903188 CS 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
TO THE CLERK OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, pursuant to Rule 4-501 (l)(d) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, that all papers to be filed in support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment have been filed, and Defendant reauesis that this be submitted for decision. 
DATED this 1 U day of ^ *>>> > 199JL 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY thai a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit 
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 841 ] £ this WJ> day of "5"^-^-^- , 1992. 
\V^ s^)^-/„- rVxW 
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4 530 
Attorney for Defendant 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LATE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
<AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Civil No. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
. * < . •> 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("John"") comes now and 
respectfully objects to the "Notice to Submit" filed by defendant 
Karen Thompson ("Karen") on or about June 16, 1992. The Notice is 
premature and contrary to the direction given by the Court. 
Defendant herself has filed a Petition to Change Custody in 
the action, which is still pending. An evidentiary hearing was 
held on that motion on Kay 27 and 28, 1992. The third day of the 
hearing on her motion is scheduled for July 7, 1992. 
/ At the two day hearing, the Court acknowledged defendant's 
motion attacking the original decree, and stated that defendant's 
earlier motion, to modify the visitation provisions of the decree, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should be determined before the instant motion is considered. 
For some reason Plaintiff's counsel has no copy of defendant's 
memorandum in its files. On this date the undersigned has obtained 
a copy of the memorandum from the office of defense counsel. In 
the event the Court desires briefing of the matter now, the 
plaintiff should be permitted an opportunity to brief this very 
serious matter prior to submission for decision. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1992. 
Kitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed to Daniel Darger, Esq., on this 17th day of June, 1992, at 
100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
KiuCheil R. Barker 
l 
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Mitchell R. Barker, #453 0 
Attorney for Defendant 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
<AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
.* .*.. 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds 
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by 
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered 
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then 
approved them by his signature. Even if her ninety day period 
( 
within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the 
judgment had not already passed, her actions and those of her 
attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed. 
1 
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Decree. What she really seeks is a modification of the decree, 
without following Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without 
showing changed circumstances and without following the clear 
procedural requirements and pre-conditions contained in the Decree. 
Par. 5. Since Thompson failed to appeal, she must move against 
the Decree by way of a petition to modify, showing changed 
circumstances. Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Utah 2d. 36, 3 68 P. 2d 264 
(1962) . 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1952. 
Mitchell R. .Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June, 
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100 
Commercial Club Building, 3 2 Exchanae Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
11 
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Defendant 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
.* 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds 
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by 
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered 
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to themf and then 
approved them by his signature. Even if her ninety day period 
within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the 
judgment had not already passed, her actions and those of her 
attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed. 
/ This response memorandum is actually not yet due. During the 
/ 1 
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entered upon the minutes of the court." 73 Am.Jur2d Stipulations 
Sec. 2 (1974) (footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with 
approval in Barker v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Thompson has no basis for relief from her voluntarily entered 
Decree. What she really seeks is a modification, without following 
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without showing changed 
circumstances and without following the clear procedure and pre-
conditions in the Decree. Par. 5. Since Thompson failed to 
appeal, she must move against the Decree by way of a petition to 
modify, showing changed circumstances. Anderson v. Anderson, 12 
Utah 2d. 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). Yet she argues as if on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June, 
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100 
Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
I 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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he hail purchased the panties worn by E. in 
the picture. Mrs. Workman corroborated, 
lenl ifyi i ig thut s h e ili«l no l rcmeiiihcr the 
picture being La ken and that she had never 
seen the picture or the panties before. Mr. 
Workman testified thai he could not re-
member the picture being taken. Even 
though defendants knew that Kelly had 
behaved inappropriately with E., much of 
the ioappropiiate behavior that they knew 
about occurred in 1987 and 1988 and the 
photograph was taken hi 1986. Moreover, 
any knowledge of inappropriate behavior 
does not go to whether they knew the 
photo was being taken, nor at what angle 
and foeii*. Further, while Kelly did testify 
to sexually abutting E., he never testified to 
being sexually aroused by the photo hi 
question nor of taking or possessing it for 
the purpose of being aroused, nor of telling 
defendants that the photo aroused hhu. 
In short, no evidence supports a conclu-
sion that defendants knew that E.'s but-
tocks were only partially covered moments 
before the photo was taken, that they 
knowingly allowed Kelly to take or possess 
the photo, or thnt they knew the photo was 
taken or possessed by Kelly for the pur-
pose of sexually arousing him. The State 
therefore failed to present any evidence on 
the intent element of the offense chare., d 
Thus, the judge was justified in arresting 
the judgment on the basis that the facts 
proved did not constitute an offense. 
OUSTHUCTJON OF JUSTICE 
| 5 | The State charged Mrs. Wotkman 
with obstruction of justice in violation of 
Utah Code Ann | 10 8 306 4 The reipii 
site criminal intent Is "with intent to hin-
der, prevent, or delay the discovery, appre-
hension, prosecution, conviction, or punish-
ment of another for the commission of a 
crime " 
4. Tlir Information thaiglng Mrs. Workman with 
viol.itinit of Utah CoJc Ann. f H I 306 charges 
as follmvs: 
lh.»t on or about Sc|>lcml>cr. I°*$ to August. 
I9S9. al the place aforesaid 11.4)Ion), the de-
fendants. »s parties, with Intent lu himler. 
preterit, or del.*)' the ilixovciy, apprehension, 
prosecution, convktlun or punishment of an-
Again, where either a trial or an appel-
late court, substitutes its judgment for that 
of the jury, the verdict must be based on 
evidence "so inherently Improbable that no 
reasonable mind could believe it." State v. 
Myers, COG l\2tl 260, 2n3 (Utah 19811) (Wil 
kins, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Un-
der such circumstances, an arrest of judg-
ment is appropriate. 
The Stale claims that Mrs. Workman ob-
structed justice because she knew that Kel-
ly was sexually abusing and exploiting E. 
and she deliberately withheld this informa-
tion from the police until after they con-
tacted her. The specific evidence relied on 
by the State Is Mrs. Workman's knowledge 
that Kelly sent bras to K. in late 1987 or 
early 1088, her receipt of the telephone call 
about the pool incident in the summer of 
1988, Kelly's statement that he wanted to 
marry E. made in 1087, ami the pcijod of 
daily long distance telephone CHIIS for 
which there is no date. The State further 
claims that Mrs. Workman was motivated 
to obstruct justice because she shared with 
Kelly a joint account into which he deposit-
ed hundreds of dollars. 
Mrs. Workman testified, and Kelly cor* 
roborated that she handled each incident as 
it came up. Rich time, she reprimanded 
Kelly, Informed him of the rules of her 
household and warned him not to do it 
again. Kelly testified that he concealed his 
abuse fiom the Workmaus. lu April 1988, 
when the police informed Mrs. Woikman 
that Kelly was under investigation, she 
readily provided the police with whatever 
evidence and information they requested. 
In fact, it was Mrs. Workman who, at the 
request of the police, searched her daugh-
ters' bedrooms, found the lingerie and the 
photographs and turned them over to the 
police, lloth Kelly and Mrs. Workman tes-
tified that the funds in the account were to 
pay for skating lessons for E., that Mrs. 
Workman never knew how much money 
other for the commission of a cilinc did pro-
late the offender a meant for avoiding Jls-
cotciy or apprehension, obstruct by deception 
anyone front pcifiMiiilitf an act thai might 
lead to discovery, apprehension, prosecution 
or conviction of a person, or conceal, alter or 
destroy physical evidence. 
GIM.MOH t. CUMMINCS 
Cil«»a*« r i J 1*0J |tl«.ft Ari». |»l) 
was in the account, and that she made only and conversion 
one withdrawal of eighty five dollars. Fi-
nally, those Incidents occurred over a two 
and a half year period, during which time 
Mrs. Workman was Involved with the myri-
ad tasks of running a household of thirteen 
to fourteen |>eople plus guests. 
We agree with the trial court that the 
evidence is inherently Improbable such that 
a reasonable mind could not conclude that 
In 1986 and 1987 Mrs. Workman was aware 
that Kelly was sexually exploiting E. and 
that thereafter she hclj>cd him conceal the 
ciiine until April 1988. Further, it Is Inher-
ently improbable that, even if she were 
aware of the abuse, the joint bank account 
would have motivated Mrs. Workman to 
conceal Kelly's abuse of her daughter. We 
therefore find that the trial court was justi-
fied in arresting Judgment against Mra. 
Workman because the facta proved did not 
sup|K>rt the offense charged. 
Affirmed. 
Utah J 2f] 
11»e Third District Coui 
Summit County. J. Dennis Frederick. J 
granted summary judgment for dcfei 
dauts, and appeal was taken. The Court r 
Appeals, Greenwood, J.# held that trif 
court improperly granted summary judj 
ment prior to lime In which plaintiff wa 
entitled to file rc*|mnse to defendants' mc 
tinn to strike portions of his affidavit op 
posing summary Judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judgment «-=»!8ft 
Trial court Improperly granted summa-
ry judgment prior to time in which nonmuv-
ant was entitled to file response to mov-
ants' motion to strike portion* of his affida-
vit opposing summary judgment. Judicial 
Administration ftule 4-60l(IXb). 
I1ENCII and GREENWOOD, 
concur. 
w. 
illlltlUM) 
Charles F. GIM.MOR, Jr., Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
I). Gilbert Alhay (argued). Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Druce A. Maak, Michael M. U t e r (ar-
gued), Salt U k e City, for defendants and 
respondents Garlick, Pelton 4 Valley Rank. 
I^owell V. Suminerhays. Murray, for de-
fendants and rc*jH>ndciila Timber Uke. 
Dennis M. Aatill, Salt U k e City, for de-
fendant and respondent Valley Usuk. 
Refore RENCII, II11 I INGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
Velgh CUMAtlNCS. Jeffrey K. Garlick. 
Janet E. Gnrllck, Peter Swauer. W. Al-
Ian Pelton. Timber Lakes Corporation, 
a Utah corporation. Valley Rank and 
Trust Company as trustee for the W. 
Allan Pelton Trust and for John Does 1 
thtough 48, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 8905S2-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 22. 1991. 
Iloundary dispute was brought, alleg-
ing, inter alia, unlawful detainer, trespass 
uuhn.0 K» at* rzd-it 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD. Judge: 
Appellant Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (Gill-
mor) appeals the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of appellees Jeffrey K. and 
Janet K. Garlick (the Garlicka). and W. 
Allan Pelton and Valley Rank and Trust 
Company as trustee for the W. Allan Pel-
ton Trust (Pelton). We conclude that the 
summary judgment was granted prema-
turely because Gillmor was not given ade-
quate time to res|>ond to appellees' motion 
to strike portions of his affidavit opposing 
summary ^dgmer . t . Therefore, we re-
verse. 
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We reverse because of procedural error, 
and not on either issue tiilhnor argues on 
appeal.' Theicfore, we do not address the 
substantive issues Cilhnor presents. 
ANALYSIS 
procedural Error 
Appellees' motion In strike parts of (Jill 
inor's first affidavit wan based on Utah 
It Civ P. f>ll(c). That rule provides that in a 
Buininary judgment motion, "|s)opportiug 
and opposing affidavits shall he made on 
personal know ledge, shall set forth surh 
farts as would he admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affi-
ant is competent to testify lo the matters 
staled therein." The motion to strike was 
filetl simultaneously with, hut separately 
from, appellees' reply memorandum sup-
porting their underlying summary judg-
ment motion. 
Hecause appellees' Rule 00(c) ohjection to 
Cillmor's fiist affidavit was framed as a 
separate, written motion to strike, Cilhnor 
should have been given ten days to re-
spond, as prescrihed hy Utah Code .lod Ad-
min. 4 501(1 )(h). Additionally, hecause the 
motion was served on Cillinor hy mail. 
Utah It Civ .P. 0(e) entitled him to an addi 
tioual three days. Therefore, hecause the 
motion to strike was served on January 12, 
P.lM'.i, (lilhuor should have been given until 
January 'IU to respond. 
(lilhuor could have responded to the mo-
tion to strike hy supplementing his affida-
vit to meet Hole M'»(c) standards. Utah 
It Civ.P. 60(e) (court may permit parly to 
summary judgment motion to supplement 
affidavits with depositions, answers to in 
ier rogatories, or further affidavits). He-
cause summary judgment is appropriate 
only when it is clear lhat no disputed issues 
of material fact exist, we believe that Cill-
inor should have been allowed to respond 
to the motion in this fashion, and that the 
trial court should have considered such a 
1. Ahhongh flilhnor thJ nni Include pioccdoial 
trior as a basis lor appeal tti his biict, he ilid 
aigoe I he Issue before the trial com I. We con-
sider the procedural Issue on aejtcal for pi.-»e-
llial reason*: wc are unable lu determine limit 
the record bcfoie us uhal the com! ario.illy 
considered hi gianting the suiuin.ny judgment 
response, If timely received, before ruling 
• on the motion to strike and the summary 
judgment motion. It was error, however, 
to rule on the motions on January 111, six 
days before Cillmor's lime to respond to 
the motion to strike had expired. 
Cillmor's motion to reconsider, ami the 
affiilavits filed with that motion, were filed 
on January 2fi. 1981). Under the combined 
operation of Utah Code Jud.Admin. 4~ 
COMIX") and Utah It Civ P. 0(e), these ma-
terials would have been timely if they had 
been submitted ns a response to appellees' 
motion lo strike, (lillmor's motion lo re-
consider also directed the trial court's at-
tention to the prematurity of the summary 
judgment under Utile 4-001(1 Mb). At that 
point, the trial court should have corrected 
the procedural problem with its summary 
judgment ruling by reconsidering that rul-
ing in light of Cillmor's January 26 affida-
vits. However, the record does not reveal 
whether the trial court denied the motion to 
reconsider upon study of Cillmor's January 
2f> affidavits or, in denying the motion lo 
reconsider, disregarded those affidavits al-
together. 
Hecause the tiial court granted summary 
judgment prematurely under the Applicable 
procedural rules, and because nothing in 
the record indicates that the court correct-
ed its procedural error when that error was 
called to its attention, the summary judg-
ment is set aside. Set Giuco fishing &. 
llcniol Tools, Inc. v. 11 on wood Explora-
tion. Inc., 7:i5 P 2d 02, 02-0.1 (Utah l!»8r); 
K.O. v. /Vinson, H8 P 2d 088, 6'JI (Utah 
Ct.App l!)B8). We reverse ami remand lo 
the trial court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. Fach party shall pay hit 
or its own costs. 
i 1 9 1 
I 
•h i 
il 
HENCII and HILLINGS, JJ., concur. »!«] 
xlll litIIH> 
and driiying the motion for reconsideration. 
Ibis Is simitar l«> those cases where wc remand 
for findings because see are unable lo discern 
from the record how the com I resolved material 
Issues. Sc< Anon r. Miian. M l V Id 996. 999 
(UMh I9S7); State v. btvrpen. 79ft 1MJ 767,. 
770-71 (Utah Cl A|.p 1990). ** 
IIOWCI L 
Clu *• * * T.14 I 
Walter Jiuite* IIONFLL. Plaintiff 
nod Appellee, 
v. 
Iliuhara Joyce IIOWLI.L. Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890596-CA. 
Couil of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 28, I99L 
Divorce was sought. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Frank (]. 
M. Noel, J , granted divorce, awarded alimony, 
IlJ'itV mill divided property. Former wife appeal-
JljjSs' tll- flie Court of Appeals, Crcenwood, J., 
l l T f e * n c ^ t n a l : U ) l , , : i ' court erroneously looked 
fijjiS'S' *° preseparation standard of living in set-
nMjii;'' ting alimony and should have considered 
fltfj/fiij; standard of living dining marriage up to 
rjjitime of trial approximately two years after 
ctil future tax consequences of propeity 
jr. division pursuant to divorce. 
tvt/r Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
*;t<j: remanded. 
jl ' | Itciieh, J , concurred in part, dissented 
Y^ In part, and filed opinion. 
? 
7 1. Dlvoice 4-2.17 
bj t Alimony was erroneously based on pre-
LliP) separation slamlard of living and should 
|£J have been based on standard of living dur-
1- lug the marriage up lo lime of divorce tiial 
:'ix about two years after separation; during 
^; that two year period, husband's income 
ji? doubled because another airline purchased 
jll* husband's employer, ami husbands ability 
|j/jj lo take advantage of lhat change in part 
jKJIv resulted from perseverance during lean 
'ItfirM. times. 
i*mk>*- Ulvorce <^253(3) 
' 111 Value of marital property is deter* 
J. mined as of lime of divorce decree or at 
r trial, but courts can, in exercise of their 
>«, equitable powers, use different date, such 
t. IIOWKI I. Mai, |2()9 
>Ut |Ul«S A , . r . | SSI I 
as dale of separation, if one party has 
acted obstiuctively. 
3. Divorce «~237 
Determining standard of living in or-
der to set alimony after divorce is fact sen-
sitive, subjective tusk and is not determined 
by actuul expenses alone. 
4. Divorce *--»M5 
Trial courts have discretion to deter-
mine standard of living which existed dur-
ing mariinge after consideration of rele-
vant facts and equitable principles. 
5. Divorce «^ 217 
Trial courts must consider the follow-
ing factors in setting alimony afler divorce: 
financial conditions and needs of recipient 
spouse, recipient's ability to produce in-
come, and ability of payor spouse lo pro-
vide support. 
6. Divorce *^2tO(2, 
Trial court selling alimony after di-
vorce should first determine financial needs 
and resources of both parties and should 
set alimony ns permitted by those parame-
ters to approximate parties' standard of 
living during marriage as closely as pnssi 
Ide. 
7. Divorce 4-210(2) 
If payor spouse's resources are ade-
quate, alimony following divorce need not 
be limited to provide for only tutsir needs, 
but t hould also consider recipiml spouse's 
station In life. 
8. Divorce 4^219 
Trial court setting alimony after di 
vorce must make findings on all matt rial 
issues. 
9. Divorce «=»2.19, 280(9) 
Trial court's failure to make findings 
on all issues material to setting alimony 
after divorce constitutes reversible error, 
unless pertinent facts in record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only finding in favor of judgment. 
10. Divorce <t=>2IO(t) 
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was 
Inadequate to equalize abilities of former 
wife and former husband to go forward 
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